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Oil and Gas: Top Leasing After Voiles v. Santa Fe
Minerals - Unethical Claim-jumping or Prudent
Business Practice?*
L Introduction
A top lease is a "subsequent oil and gas lease which covers one or more mineral
interests that are subject to a valid, subsisting prior lease."' Generally, parties word
a top lease so that it becomes effective upon the expiration or termination of the
prior lease, known as the base or bottom lease! Top leasing has existed in the oil
and gas industry for several years, but the propriety and legality of the practice have
long been matters of debate, especially in Oklahoma.3 Although the industry and
the courts at one time viewed top leasing as immoral and illegal, Oklahoma courts
and the Oklahoma oil and gas industry now view top leasing as a useful business
practice.4 Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, in particular, focused on the economic
realities of business competition rather than on the ethics of top leasing. As a result,
the court implicitly accepted top leasing as a favorable method of insuring that
mineral lessees continue oil and gas production and pay competitive prices to
mineral lessors." By recognizing top leasing as an established practice in Okla-
homa,7 Voiles has resolved the confusion found in earlier Oklahoma case law
dealing with top leases.
This note will describe the different types of top leases, chronicle how the status
of top leasing in Oklahoma and in other oil and gas jurisdictions has changed over
the decades, and discuss the various legal problems associated with executing a top
lease. Next, it will explain what steps top lessees should take to ensure the safety
of their investments and how top lessees may protect themselves from liability to
bottom lessees. Finally, this note will demonstrate how top leasing serves the
interests of both mineral lessors and mineral lessees, thus providing Oklahoma with
economic benefits.
* Winning note, Oklahoma Bar Association Mineral Law Section Writing Award for 1998.
1. Michael L. Brown, Effect of Top Leases: Obstruction of Title and Related Considerations, 30
BAYLOR L. Rav. 213, 213 (1978).
2. See Michael E. Jackson & Margaret L. Weissbrod, Top Leasing in the Appalachian Basin, 6 E.
MIN. L. FOUND. 12-1, 12-5 (1985).
3. See Max H. Ernest, III, Top Leasing - Legality v. Morality, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 957,
958-59 (1980).
4. See Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, 911 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Okla. 1996).
5. 911 P.2d 1205 (Okla. 1996).
6. See id. at 1212.
7. See id. at 1209.
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II. Types of Top Leases
There are two basic types of top leases: the common-lessee (or two party) top
lease and the divergent-lessee (or three party) top lease.' In a common-lessee top
lease, the same lessee holds both the top and the bottom lease." The lessee secures
a second (top) lease, which covers part or all of the same mineral interest, while the
original (bottom) lease is still effective, typically prior to the termination or
expiration of the bottom lease." For example: R (the mineral owner and lessor)
leases his mineral interests to E (the lessee) for a primary term of five years
beginning June 1, 1994. On April 1, 1999 (two months before the end of the
primary term), R executes a new lease (the top lease) with E, covering the same
mineral interest as in the original lease (the bottom lease)."
The second and more common type of top lease is the divergent-lessee top
lease.' The divergent-lessee top lease involves the original lessor (or the lessor's
successor in interest) and a new lessee. The original lessee is not a party to the
top lease. For example: R (the mineral owner and lessor) leases his mineral
interests to B (the bottom lessee) for a primary term of five years beginning June
1, 1994. On April 1, 1999 (two months before the end of the primary term), R
executes a lease (the top lease) with T (the top lessee), a stranger to the first
lease.
4
The divergent-lessee top lease has produced the most amount of litigation."
Suits involve conflicts such as: (1) who owns the leasehold; 6 (2) whether the
lessor has repudiated the bottom lease by executing a top lease; 7 (3) whether the
8. See Brown, supra note 1, at 213-14; see also Ernest, supra note 3, at 958; Jackson &
Weissbrod, supra note 2, at 12-5; J. Hovey Kemp, Top Leasing for Oil and Gas: The Legal Perspective,
59 DENy. LJ. 641,642 (1982); J. Clayton Johnson, The Top Lease - No Longer a Stranger in the Lease
Block, 34 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 201, 203 (1983).
9. See Brown, supra note 1, at 214; Ernest, supra note 3, at 958; Jackson & Weissbrod, supra note
2, at 12-5.
10. See Brown, supra note 1, at 214. Top leasing by the same lessee may appear to be a
"substituted contract" or "novation." If viewed as a substituted contract or novation, the top lease would
supersede the bottom leae. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 210. Determining whether the top lease is
indeed a novation of the prior lease often involves analyzing the language of the new lease. If the new
lease is silent on the existence of the prior lease, courts will presume that the parties intended to
supersede the prior lease with the new lease. See id. at 211. If a top lease includes some sort of
subordinating language, such as the word "subject to," then it is clear that the top lease will take effect
only after the bottom leasa has expired or terminated, and thus would not be considered a novation. See
infra text accompanying notes 154-60.
11. For similar examples, see Brown, supra note 1, at 213; Ernest, supra note 3, at 958; Jackson
& Weissbrod, supra note 2, at 12-5.
12. See Jackson & Weissbrod, supra note 2, at 12-5.
13. See id.
14. For similar examples, see Brown, supra note 1, at 213; Ernest, supra note 3, at 958; Jackson
& Weissbrod, supra note 2, at 12-5.
15. See Jackson & Weissbrod, supra note 2, at 12-5.
16. See id.; see also Kemp, supra note 8, at 642-43.




top lessee has slandered the bottom lessee's title by taking a top lease;" (4)
whether a top lessee should be liable for champerty and maintenance if he
encourages the lessor to bring a lease cancellation suit against the bottom lessee;"
(5) whether a top lease violates the rule against perpetuities;,o and (6) whether the
top lessee should be liable for tortious interference with contract for taking a top
lease.2 ' Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals' addresses many of these issues, helps to
solidify the validity of top leases, and erases any residual concerns of the effect and
status of top leasing.
Ilf. Law Prior to Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals
To appreciate fully the Voiles decision and how it lays to rest any residual
concerns about the illegality and impropriety of top leasing, a discussion of early
case law on top leasing is required. Indeed, Oklahoma cases varied in their results
and reasoning to such an extent that the effect of top leasing remained debatable for
several years.
A. Cases Upholding the Validity of a Top Lease
In 1923, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Rorex v. Karcher" that a top
lease is valid, provided that top lessees take their top leases subject to the rights of
bottom lessees.u The Rorex court reached this conclusion by reasoning that, as title
owners of the property in fee simple absolute, landowners may carve from the fee
as many estates as they desire." Executing a second oil and gas lease during the
existence of the first lease falls well within the landowners' rights and
prerogatives. However, if they have already executed a top lease on the property,
landowners are not free to extend the term of the bottom lease in derogation of the
top lessee's rights. Such an extension, the court concluded, would damage the top
lessee's rights under his top lease.'
Three years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided a similar case, Gypsy Oil
Co. v. Marsh.? In Gypsy, the principal issue was whether the bottom lease had
expired at the end of its primary term." The top lessee sued the bottom lessee,
18. See Jackson & Weissbrod, supra note 2, at 12-5; Kemp, supra note 8, at 642-43; see also infra
notes 84-92, 134-37 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981); Voiles v. Santa Fe
Minerals, 911 P.2d 1205 (Okla. 1996).
20. See, e.g., Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
21. See, e.g., James Energy Co. v. HCG Energy Corp., 847 P.2d 333 (Okla. 1992); Voiles v. Santa
Fe Minerals, 911 P.2d 1205 (Okla. 1996).
22. 911 P.2d 1205 (Okla. 1996).
23. 224 P. 696 (Okla. 1923).
24. See id. at 697.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 697-98.
28. See id.
29. 248 P. 329 (Okla. 1926).
30. See id at 331.
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seeking the cancellation of the bottom lease and thus quieting title in the top
lessee." The Gypsy court rejected the bottom lessee's claim that the existence of
a top lease constituted a defense to the suit." Instead, it affirmed the trial court's
decision to cancel the bottom lease because the bottom lessee failed to produce oil
in paying quantities?3
Jennings v. Elliot' is another case that appears to uphold the validity of top
leases. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that landowners have a right to execute
a top lease. 5 Executing a top lease, the court concluded, would "in no way
interfere" with defendants' rights under the bottom lease.'
Four decades after it decided Jennings, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Mitchell
v. Amerada Hess Corp.,' confronted the issue of whether a top lessee who aids a
lessor in suing to cancel a bottom lease is engaged in champerty and main-
tenance."a The facts of Mitchell are very similar to the facts in Voiles v. Santa Fe
Minerals, Inc." In Mitchell, the top lessees sought a contract from the mineral
owners to become the owners' agent for the purposes of obtaining a cancellation and
release of the bottom leases.' The Mitchell court noted that "any interest whatever
in the subject matter of the suit, [w]hether great or small, vested or contingent,
certain or uncertain," will be sufficient to defeat a charge of champerty.42
Possession of some top leases respecting the land involved in the suit was sufficient
to exempt the top lessees from a charge of champerty and maintenance.42 Thus, the
court affirmed the top leases' validity 3
Nebraska case law is in accord with these early Oklahoma cases. In Willan v.
Farrar" the Nebraska Supreme Court cited approvingly to Rorex and found that
lessors have no power to waive a defective rental payment by a bottom lessee as
31. See id.
32. See id at 334. Furthermore, the Gypsy court questioned the ethics of the top lease. "[The top
lessee] took his lease at a time when the oil company's lease was in force. . . and at a time when he
knew that it was claiming an estate in the premises because of [an oil] discovery, and [knew] that he was
purchasing litigation." Id Because the bottom lessee drilled a shallow well in bad faith in order to gain
more time to drill another well in deeper sand, the court refused to "plac[e] its protecting arm around
either party." Id
33. See id
34, 97 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1939).
35. See id at 70-71.
36. See id. at 71.
37. 638 P.2d 441 (Olda. 1981).
38. Worrel v. Roxan2 Petroleum Corp., 291 P. 47, 48-49 (Okla. 1930) defined champerty and
maintenance as "officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or
assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it."
39. 911 P.2d 1205 (Okla. 1996).
40. See Mitchell, 638 P.2d at 442.
41. Id at 444 (quoting Worrel v. Roxanna Petroleum Corp., 291 P. 47, 48-49 (Okla. 1930)).
42. See id at 445.
43. See id at 446.




against a top lessee.45 Once lessors issue the top leases to a top lessee, lessors owe
an implied duty not to render the top leases ineffective.
B. Cases Rejecting the Validity of a Top Lease
In contrast to the above-cited cases is Simons v. McDaniel,47 a 1932 Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision wherein the court held that acts of lessors in executing and
delivering a top lease constitute an outright declaration that a bottom lease is
terminated. The court further held that executing and delivering a top lease
obstructs the exercise of a bottom lessee's rights under the terms of the bottom
lease, thus clouding the bottom lessee's title.49
Oklahoma is not the only jurisdiction to hold that the mere existence of a top
lease constitutes a cloud on the bottom lessee's title. For example, Kansas case law
is consistent with Simons. In Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 0 the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas held that the mere existence of a top lease
constitutes an attack upon a bottom lessee's title.5 The court concluded that while
a bottom lessee's title is under attack, the bottom lessee has no obligation to carry
out any express or implied conditions of the lease.'
C. Unsettled Status of Top Leasing
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Simons subsequent to Rorex and
Gypsy, it failed to cite to either of those cases.53 Moreover, Jennings, decided six
years after Simons, made no mention of Simons or Rorex, despite the inconsistency
of the cases.' Furthering the confusion, approximately thirty years after Rorex and
Simons, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided based on
Oklahoma law"5 that "topleasing has the same invidious characteristics as claim-
jumping. '
Given the varying results and conclusions reached in these cases, top lessees
receive little comfort. Because parties rely on court decisions when deciding
whether to enter into an oil and gas leasing agreement, the oil and gas industry
45. See id. at 703-04.
46. See id.
47. 7 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1932).
48. See id. at 420.
49. See id. A cloud on title is "an outstanding claim or encumbrance which, if valid, would affect
or impair the title of the owner of a particular estate." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 255 (6th ed. 1991).
50. 255 F. Supp. 61 (D. Kan. 1966).
51. See id. at 63. The opinion does not indicate whether the top lease contained any "subject to"
language. See infra notes 154-56 concerning the use of "subject to" language.
52. See Robinson, 225 F. Supp. at 63.
53. Simons v. McDaniel, 7 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1932).
54. Jennings v. Elliott, 97 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1939).
55. See Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960).
56. Id. at 445 n.23. Snakard contended that Frankfort purposely failed to meet its drilling obligations
in order to top lease Snakard's leases after Snakard's interests were extinguished. See id. at 444-45.
Holding that Frankfort had the right but not the obligation to drill, the court rejected Snakard's contention
and found that Frankfort did not acquire any interest in Snakard's expired leases. See id. at 440, 445.
1999]
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would benefit from consistent case law on top leasing. In Voiles v. Santa Fe
Minerals, Oklahoma has finally provided sound precedent on which parties may
rely. Voiles confirms that top leasing is a valid oil and gas industry practice.
IV. Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals
A. Facts
Plaintiffs minerad lessors [collectively "Voiles"] executed several oil and gas
leases (the bottom leases) to Defendant Santa Fe Minerals (the bottom lessee)."6
Plaintiff Oklahoma Hugoton Corporation ["Hugoton"] paid Voiles for top leases of
the area already leased by Santa Fe Minerals." In the process of obtaining the top
leases, Hugoton entered into a separate agreement with Voiles.' This separate
agreement authorized Hugoton to bring suit to judicially terminate Santa Fe
Minerals' bottom leases.61
B. Procedural History
Subsequently, Voiles and Hugoton brought suit to quiet title to their mineral
interests and to cicel the bottom leases owned by Santa Fe Minerals.' The
essence of the suit was that Santa Fe Minerals violated the "cessation of production"
clause! of their bcttom leases by failing to have a well capable of producing in
paying quantities for more than sixty days without commencing drilling
operations." Santa Fe Minerals counter-claimed to quiet title to its bottom
leases.' Santa Fe Minerals also filed a third-party claim against Hugoton, alleging
tortious interference with contract, slander of title,67 and champerty and main-
tenance.r "
The trial court rejected Voiles' and Hugoton's argument that the cessation of
production clause terminated the bottom leases.' It found Santa Fe Minerals'
57. 911 P.2d 1205 (Okla. 1996).
58. See id. at 1207
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1207-08.
61. See id.
62. See iU. at 1208.
63. This clause allows a lessee to maintain a lease that has ceased to produce, usually by requiring
the lessee to commence drilling operations on a new well. See Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323,
327 (Okla. 1994); see also infra notes 75-83, 120-32 and accompanying text.
64. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1208.
65. See id.
66. See infra notes 98-113, 138-43 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 84-92, 134-37 and accompanying text.
68. Seesupranotes 37-43 and accompanying text;see infra notes 114-18, 144-53 and accompanying
text.




bottom leases to be the "presently existing" leasesm The trial court also canceled
and set aside the top leases.7'
Concerning Santa Fe Minerals' claims against Hugoton for slander of title and for
champerty and maintenance, the court rendered judgment in favor of Hugoton.'
However, Santa Fe Minerals' claim for tortious interference with contract was
successful." All parties' appeals were consolidated. 4
C. Decision
1. Cessation of Production Clause
The first issue the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided concerned the cessation of
production clause. The bottom leases were executed between 1937 and 1950."
Thus, by the time Voiles and Hugoton brought the lease cancellation suit, the ten
year primary term of each lease had expired, and only production of the minerals
could keep the leases from being terminated.76 The bottom leases' habendum clause
provided for a primary term of ten years and "as long thereafter as oil, gas,
casinghead gas or any of them is produced."" Voiles and Hugoton argued that the
sixty-day cessation of production clause controlled the habendum clause!'
Therefore, because Santa Fe Minerals had failed to produce for more than sixty
days without commencing drilling operations, Plaintiffs claimed that the bottom
leases should be canceled."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, relying primarily on Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,'
held that a lease in its secondary term will not terminate under the terms of the
habendum clause when a well is at all times capable of producing in paying quanti-
ties.' Only if a lessee fails to comply with the implied covenant to market may the







75. See id. at 1207.
76. See id.
77. I& at 1208.
78. The habendum clause, also known as the term clause, sets the lease duration and usually consists
of two sub-parts: the primary term and the secondary term. The primary term is a fixed term of years
during which the lessee has the right, without the obligation, to explore for oil and gas or to drill for oil
and gas on the premises. The secondary term starts after the primary term when production is being
obtained. See EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 159 (2d ed.
1993).
79. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1208.
80. 869 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1994).
81. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1208.
82. See id.
83. See i at 1208-09.
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2. Slander of Title
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also considered the trial court's denial of Santa Fe
Minerals' slander of title claim." Hugoton defended by arguing that, if the trial
court found the bottom leases to be valid, then the top leases could simply be dis-
regarded." Hugoton also argued that it had brought suit in good faith to remove
a cloud on Voiles' mineral interest, that is, the allegedly expired leases belonging
to Santa Fe Minerals.' Because malice is an essential element of a slander of title
action, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had to decide whether Hugoton acted in
good faith or bad faith when it sued to cancel Santa Fe Minerals' bottom leases. A
showing of good faith indicates a lack of malice."
Hugoton argued that it showed good faith in bringing the suit only after a trial
court judgment agadnst Santa Fe Minerals in a similar suit."9 Hugoton also argued
that it had a good faith belief that Santa Fe Minerals' bottom leases constituted a
cloud on Voiles' mineral interests. o These two arguments combined to form the
impression that Voiles had a colorable claim against Santa Fe Minerals.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Santa
Fe Minerals' slander of title claims against Hugoton.2 The court reasoned that
Hugoton had not acted in bad faith or without probable cause when it sued to cancel
Santa Fe Minerals' bottom leases because "a party is entitled to litigate a matter of
first impression."" In Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,9' the Oklahoma Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the first impression question of "whether a lease, held
by a gas well which is capable of producing in paying quantities but is shut-in for
a period in excess of sixty (60) days but less than one year due to a marketing
decision made by the producer, expires of its own terms under the 'cessation of
production' clause unless shut-in royalty payments are made."9 This question of
first impression was very similar to the one in Voiles, but Pack had not been
84. See id. at 1209.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Denis Binder, Slander of Title and Assorted Slings and Arrows of the Property Bar, 13 E.
MaN. L. FOUND. § 13.02 [5][b] (1992).
88. "Considered together, the Oklahoma cases appear to give the term 'malice' this meaning: that
the defendant acted deliberately in asserting a claim without reasonable grounds for believing in its
validity." Eugene 0. Kuntz, Discussion Notes, 12 OIL & GAS REP. 912-13 (1994).
89. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1209.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1210.
92. See id.
93. I. (quoting Dctson v. Rainbolt, 894 P.2d 1109, 1115 (Okla. 1995)).
94. 869 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1994).
95. lI. at 325.
96. The Voiles court stated:
The primary issu - in this appeal is the application of the sixty-day cessation of production
clause, and whether it controls the habendum clause in the lease .... The cessation of
production clause in the base lease provided for cessation of the lease after the expiration




decided until after Hugoton and Voiles had brought their appealY Thus, Voiles'
and Hugoton's suit still involved a question of first impression.
3. Tortious Interference with Contract
A third issue which confronted the Voiles court was tortious interference with
contract.98 This tort arises when one who is not a party to a contract interferes with
that contract by encouraging one of the contracting parties to breach its terms.
9
In a top leasing situation, a bottom lessee might assert this tort when the top lessee
encourages the lessor to seek cancellation of the bottom lease."
At trial, the judge found that Hugoton intentionally interfered with the leases
between Voiles and Santa Fe Minerals." However, the trial judge also found that
Hugoton performed an important service, for Voiles by helping Voiles to revisit their
contractual relationship with Santa Fe Minerals." 2 Thus, only nominal damages
were awarded."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the judgment, finding that Hugoton had
not intentionally interfered with Santa Fe Minerals' contracts and business
relations.l" The court noted that those who are not parties to a contract (or lease)
can be held liable for tortious interference."l If Hugoton was acting as Voiles'
agent when it sued Santa Fe Minerals, then Hugoton would not be liable for
wrongfully interfering with the bottom lease between Voiles and Santa Fe
Minerals."
Pointing to trial testimony of two mineral owners, Santa Fe Minerals, on appeal,
claimed that Hugoton filed suit without the express authorization of the owners."
However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that this testimony was not sufficient
to affect Hugoton's status as Voiles' agent."l The court examined in detail a letter
which appointed Hugoton as Voiles' special agent having "full and complete power
well within sixty days of the cessation .... This precise issue was resolved in Pack v.
Santa Fe Minerals.
Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1208 (citation omitted).
97. See id at 1208-09.
98. The elements of tortious interference with contract (also known as malicious interference with
contract) are: (1) that [the plaintiff] had a business or contractual relationship that was interfered with;
(2) that the interference was malicious and wrongful, and that such interference was neither justified,
privileged, nor excusable; and (3) that damage was proximately sustained as a result of the complained
of interference. James Energy Corp. v. HCG Energy Corp., 847 P.2d 333,340 (Okla. 1992) (citing Mac
Adjustment, Inc. v. Property Loss Research, 595 P.2d 427, 428 (Okla. 1979)).
99. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1211.
100. See id at 1209.
101. See id at 1210.
102. See id. at 1211.
103. See id at 1210.
104. See id
105. See id. at 1211.
106. See id
107. See id. at 1210.
108. See id.
1999]
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to take all necessary steps to obtain a release and judicial termination of the [bottom
leases]."'" Each of the mineral owners received and signed the letter."'
This fact heavily influenced the supreme court to conclude that Hugoton acted as
Voiles' agent."' However, there was plenty of testimony demonstrating that the
mineral owners either ignored the agency provisions in the letter or did not
understand that a suit would be filed on their behalf."' Furthermore, some mineral
owners testified that they would not have filed suit if Hugoton had not approached
them with an offer to take a top lease and to pay their litigation costs for suing to
cancel the bottom leases."' This latter testimony is important for resolving the
next issue presented to the court, champerty.
4. Champerty anil Maintenance
The final issue the Voiles court analyzed involved the old legal doctrines of
champerty and maintenance."" The court framed the issue succinctly: "Is it
champerty for the mineral lessee to assist the lessor with a quiet title
proceeding?" '' S Citing Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.," the court answered in
the negative."7 Because top leases are "characteristic of the industry" and because
Voiles lacked funds to maintain litigation against Santa Fe Minerals, the court
reasoned that advancing funds to Voiles did not violate any principle of law or
public policy."'
V. Case Analysis
Voiles is a part of a long line of Oklahoma decisions which clarify the meaning
of the word "production" in oil and gas leases."' As part of this history, Voiles
offers stability and valuable precedent to parties engaging in oil and gas transac-
tions. Voiles also represents the view that business realities rather than ethical
considerations should govern these transactions.
A. Cessation of Production Clause
1. History of the Term "Production"
The major issue in Voiles concerned the cessation of production clause." In
accord with the minority view, the Oklahoma definition of the terms "produced" or





114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1212.
116. 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
117. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1212,
118. Id (citing Lott v. Kees, 165 So. 2d 106, 111 (Ala. 1964)).
119. See infra notes 120-28.




"production" has changed over the years from "production in paying quantities"''
(when referring to production during both the primary and secondary terms of the
habendum clause) to "capability of production in paying quantities"'" (when
referring to production in the primary term of the habendum clause). "Produced"
or "production," as used in the secondary term of the habendum clause" and as
used in the cessation of production clause, 2  also mean "capable of being
produced in paying quantities."
If a lessee has completed a well capable of producing oil or gas in paying
quantities, the lease remains in force throughout the secondary term, allowing the
lessee to have a reasonable amount of time to market production diligently.'
Actual production, as required by the majority of oil and gas producing states, is not
necessary to keep the lease in force in Oklahoma."
Because Oklahoma classifies the nature of an oil and gas lease in its secondary
term as a profit a prendre whose duration is that of a fee simple on condition
subsequent,'" the grantor (or in this case the lessor) must bring an action to cause
forfeiture." The lease will not automatically terminate once oil or gas is capable
of being produced.
2. Cessation of Production Clause in Voiles
Relying primarily on Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals," the Voiles court reiterated
that a lease in its secondary term will not terminate under the terms of the
habendum clause when a well is at all times capable of producing in paying
quantities."3 The requirement of mere capability to produce in paying quantities
allows the lessee voluntarily to cease removal of gas for a reasonable time without
forfeiting his lease.' During this time of cessation of production, the lessee may
121. Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954) ("Oklahoma is committed to the doctrine that when
an oil and gas lease provides that it shall remain in force and effect for a certain term and so long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced, the term 'produced means produced in paying quantities.") The
opinion does not make clear whether actual production was necessary or whether capability of production
was sufficient to hold a lease.
122. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Carter Oil Co., 336 P.2d 1086, 1095 (Okla. 1958) ("In
the absence of a specific clause requiring marketing within the primary term... the completion of a well
... capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities will extend such term... provided that within
a reasonable time... a market is obtained.") This decision makes clear that capability of production will
suffice to hold a lease; actual production is not required.
123. See Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978).
124. See Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1994); Danne v. Texaco Exploration &
Prod. Inc., 883 P.2d 210 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
125. See Danne, 883 P.2d at 214.
126. See Pack, 869 P.2d at 328.
127. See Danne, 883 P.2d at 214. A "profit a prendre" is an incorporeal right to enter upon another's
land and to extract substances. 1 EUGENE 0. KtUNTZ A TREATmSE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §3.1
(1987) [hereinafter KUNTZ TREATISE].
128. See Danne, 883 P.2d at 213.
129. 869 P.2d 323, 327 (Okla. 1994).
130. See Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, 911 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Okla. 1996).
131. See Pack 869 P.2d at 331.
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diligently seek markets which offer higher prices. Only if a lessee fails to comply
with the implied covenant to market may the lease be canceled.'
Professor Owen L. Anderson of the University of Oklahoma characterizes the
Pack decision as an "excellent discussion of Oklahoma law [which] correctly
interprets case law precedent."'33 Because Voiles relied heavily upon Pack, Voiles
represents a continuation of the Oklahoma view on "capability of production in
paying quantities." Consistent with prior case law on the subject, Voiles provides
stability - valuable precedent on which parties may rely when considering whether
to take legal action or whether to enter into an oil and gas lease.
B. Slander of Title
When a top lessee joins a mineral lessor in a suit to cancel the bottom lease, the
bottom lessee might defend against the suit by asserting that his title has been
slandered. To buttress this argument, the bottom lessee might assert that the
execution of an oil and gas lease, despite the continued validity of his prior lease,
constitutes slander of his title." However, the largest hurdle the bottom lessee
faces in proving that his title has been slandered is showing that the top lessee acted
with malice. If the top lessee has a valid interest, the fact that the lessor executed
the top lease does not show that either party has acted in bad faith or with lack of
probable cause.'35
The Voiles court found that Hugoton had a good faith belief that the allegedly
expired bottom leases owned by Santa Fe Minerals constituted a cloud on Voiles'
mineral interests." The fact that the court found that Hugoton acted without
malice in bringing the lease cancellation suit is important because it strikes a proper
balance between two competing public policies. The first policy is that a person
should be able to assert his property rights without fear of being sued if it turns out
that his title is bad. The second policy is that a person should be able to enjoy his
property and should be free of others asserting claims that impair the merchan-
tability and value of his title.'37 By requiring Santa Fe Minerals to prove that
Hugoton acted with malice, the Voiles court furthered both of these goals.
C. Tortious Interference with Contract
Similarly, tortious interference with contract requires that the top lessee act in bad
faith or without probable cause in bringing a lease cancellation suit against a bottom
lessee.'38 The primary factor which led the Oklahoma Supreme Court to conclude
that there was no bad faith was the letter which appointed Hugoton as Voiles'
132. See Voiles, 91. P.2d at 1208.
133. Discussion Notes to Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 128 OIL & GAs REp. 565, 565 (1994).
134. See Petroleum Energy Inc. v. Mid America Petroleum, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1420, 1428 (D. Kan.
1991).
135. See supra note 88.
136. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1209-10.
137. See KuNrz, TIIEATIsE, supra note 127, § 12.1.




agent.'39 Authorizing Hugoton to act on Voiles' behalf to bring a lease cancellation
suit against the bottom lessees, this separate agreement established Hugoton's status
as a representative of a party to the lease.'" As a representative of a party to the
lease, Hugoton could not be liable for tortious interference.' The supreme court
noted that without Hugoton's help, many of the mineral owners would not have been
able to pay litigation expenses."2 By finding that Hugoton had not interfered with
the bottom leases when Hugoton sued on Voiles' behalf, the court laudably aided
Voiles in enforcing their contractual rights. Furthermore, by allowing Hugoton to
help Voiles enforce their contractual rights, the court aided Voiles in obtaining
additional drilling, more production, and larger royalties.'43
D. Champerty and Maintenance
When a top lessee aids or encourages the mineral lessor to bring a lease
cancellation suit against the bottom lessee, the bottom lessee may try to defend
against the suit by claiming that the mineral lessor and top lessee are engaging in
champertous conduct.'" Because the doctrines of champerty and maintenance are
based on the principle that only parties who have an actual interest in the matter
may engage in a lawsuit, bottom lessees who try to use the doctrine as a defense
to a lease cancellation suit are, in essence, asserting that top lessees have no
legitimate interest in the matter. In this situation, a bottom lessee might charge that
the top lessee is "stirring up" needless litigation.4
Regarding this issue, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Amerada Hess
Corp." held that a top lessee indeed has a legitimate interest sufficient to defeat
a champerty defense - possession of a top lease.47 The Voiles court relied upon
Mitchell when it concluded that Hugoton did not engage in champertous con-
duct.48 However, it did not state that Hugoton's possession of the top leases
constituted an "interest in the subject matter of the suit." Rather, the court focused
on the "benefits" that Hugoton provided Voiles by "policing oil companies [and]
keeping them honest" in their dealings with mineral owners.'49
The Oklahoma Supreme Court emphatically stated that it would not "prohibit
mineral owners from obtaining litigation assistance from top lessees in challenges
to the continued validity of base leases."'50 It arrived at this decision despite the
testimony of some mineral owners that they would not have sued Santa Fe Minerals





144. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
145. See Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?,
30 AM. Bus. LJ. 485, 485 (1992).
146. 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
147. See id. at 445.
148. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1211.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1212.
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if Hugoton had not approached them with an offer to take a top lease and to pay
their litigation costs for suing to cancel the bottom leases."' According to the
court, "[p]olicing oit companies [and] keeping them honest"'5 " is more important
than discouraging "unnecessary" litigation and increased costs to mineral lessees",
because of the important services the mineral owners received.
E. "Subject to" Language
Ordinarily, the in'lusion of some sort of subordinating language, such as the
words "subject to," makes it clear that a top lease will take effect only after the
bottom lease has expired or is terminated."s In fact, some commentators have
explained Simons v. McDaniel' not as an outright rejection of top leasing, but
rather as an example of how the lack of subordinating language will cause the
execution of a top lease to appear as an act of repudiation of the bottom lease by
the lessor and as an act of slander of title of the bottom lessee's title by the top
lessee. "'
Because "subject to" language in the top lease explicitly recognizes the validity
of the bottom leases, inclusion of this language would resolve problems associated
with top leasing, such as claims of slander of title and tortious interference with
contract. Yet, the Voiles court made no mention of whether the Hugoton top leases
contained any subordinating language."s The court could have quickly resolved
the issues presented by the parties by determining if the lease contained "subject to"
language. Instead, the court focused on each claim separately. By taking this
methodical approach, the court, whether inadvertently or not, emphasized the
attractive attributes of top leasing: it allowed mineral owners to revisit their
contractual relationship with their bottom lessees;' it allowed mineral owners to
151. See id at 1211.
152. Id at 1212.
153. See Martin, supi-a note 145, at 485.
154. See Kemp, supra note 8, at 659 n.100 and accompanying text; Jackson & Weissbrod, supra
note 2, at 12-7 n.3 and accompanying text; Brown, supra note 1, at 219; Johnson, supra note 8, at 216-
17.
155. 7 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1932).
156. See Brown, supra note 1, at 218.
157. The Voiles court stated:
The top lease stater, that it vests in the top lessee the mineral owner's reversionary interest
under the base lease. It further states that possession under the top lease shall vest upon
release of the base 2ease or upon a final and unappealable judgment that the base lease has
terminated. The top lease also states that if this possession does not vest then the rever-
sionary interest and top lease granted would terminate "within ten (10) years from the date
of this Agreement.
Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, 911 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Okla. 1996). Note that the wording of this lease does
not violate the rule against perpetuities, for it vests, if at all, well within twenty-one years following a
life or lives in being at the creation of the interest. For cases involving top leases or top deeds and the
rule against perpetuities, se Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976);
Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1983); Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D.
1986).




obtain additional drilling and more production (and thus a larger royalty);' 9 and
it policed oil companies and kept them honest.'"
F. Acceptance of Top Leasing Despite Cancellation
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court found no slander of title, no tortious
interference with contract, and no champerty, it affirmed the trial court's judgment
canceling the top leases. The supreme court affirmed the judgment because none
of the parties asked it to let the top leases survive its declaration of the bottom
leases' validity.'"' Despite its affirmation of the top leases' cancellation, the court
went on to characterize top leasing as a common and accepted industry practice."
It noted that trial testimony established that "[top leases] are accepted, they are
frequent, and they are simply considered to be a legitimate form of business
competition in the oil business.'"" Moreover, the court recognized that "in the oil
and gas industry there are people who take top leases and fund litigation attacking
the base lease."'" While once considered to be a form of "claim jumping,' top
leasing has now become a "useful and widespread business practice in the oil and
gas industry."'"
VI. Implications
A. Advice to Top Lessees
Voiles provides three major pieces of advice to those considering taking a top
lease. First, if a person takes a top lease in order to extinguish the bottom lease, he
should make sure to bring a lease cancellation suit under the implied covenant to
market, not under the cessation of production clause. A bottom lessee's failure to
comply with the implied covenant to market, but not its ceasing production, could
result in cancellation of its lease.6 7 Second, the top lessee should make sure that
the top lease states that it is "subject to" the bottom lease in order to avoid a slander
of title suit.'" Finally, the top lessee should enter into a separate agreement with
the lessor. This agreement should authorize the top lessee to act on behalf of the
lessor when bringing a lease cancellation suit. Having this agreement will protect
the top lessee against a tortious interference with contract action by the bottom
lessee. 69
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1212.




165. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 445 n.23 (10th Cir. 1960).
166. Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1209 (citing Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 659 (N.D.
1986)).
167. See Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1208.
168. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 98-113, 138-43 and accompanying text.
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B. Increased Drilling and Production
Voiles has implicitly accepted that top leasing is a proper method of insuring that
mineral lessees continue oil and gas production and pay competitive prices to
mineral lessors. By treating top leasing as an established business practice in
Oklahoma, the Voiles court has resolved the confusion found in earlier case law,
especially between Rorex (stating that landowners may carve out as many estates
from their fee simples as they see fit, including top leases)'70 and Simons (stating
that a top lease is an obstruction of the bottom lessee's exercise of his rights)."'
The implications of accepting top leasing as a valid and useful practice extend
far, because top leasing can be an effective tool for obtaining acreage in tightly
leased areas. At a time when the United States land drilling industry expects a
dramatic increase in drilling operations over the next five to ten years, a variety of
factors - industry consolidation, land rig attrition, the evaporation of used pipe and
spare parts, and a shortage of qualified crews - has reduced the number of
operationally-capable land rigs in the United States."n No longer willoil and gas
companies worry about the legality or impropriety of top leasing, since Voiles has
erased any residual concerns of the effect and status of top leasing.
Certainly, top leasing benefits top lessees by allowing them to gain footholds in
heavily leased areas. However, top leasing also benefits mineral lessors by allowing
them to obtain increased production and thus larger royalty payments."' Without
the fear of being top leased, a bottom lessee faces less pressure to begin drilling
operations."7 Thus, top leases provide big benefits to mineral owners.
An increase in top leasing could impact Oklahoma's economy in another way.
Years ago when rig rates were lower and drilling work was sporadic, qualified and
experienced people who ran the rigs left the industry.7 Any remaining ex-
perienced rig workers were being flown out of Oklahoma to work in Latin America
and the Gulf of Mexico.76 By increasing the practice of top leasing, thus
increasing drilling and providing steady work, experienced and qualified rig workers
may remain in Oklahoma.
VI1. Conclusion
At one time a party who acquired a top lease was considered to be a "claim
jumper. '"" After the Voiles decision, such is no longer the case. The economic
reality of business competition, rather than the ethics of top leasing, is now the
major concern of the oil and gas industry and of the courts. As one Voiles witness
170. See Rorex v. Keicher, 224 P. 696, 697 (Okla. 1923).
171. See Simons v. McDaniel, 7 P.2d 419, 420 (Okla. 1932).
172. See Brian A. Toal, U.S. Land Drillers Trip Out of Hole, OIL & GAS INVESTOR, Aug. 1997, at
22, 22.
173. See Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, 911 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Okla. 1996).
174. See Brown, supra note 1, at 242.
175. See Toal, supra rote 172, at 25.
176. See id.




testified, "[top leases] are accepted, they are frequent, and they are simply
considered to be a legitimate form of business competition in the oil business.'M
Now that Oklahoma has essentially endorsed the practice of top leasing, it seems
that top leasing is here to stay.
Marichiel Lewis
178. Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1209.
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss1/6
